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The Difficult Normalisation of 
Relations between Arab Countries 
and Bashar al-Assad 
From International Journals, Think Tank Publications and 
Arab News Media, 2019–2020 
Sarah Ch. Henkel 
The Syrian civil war seems to have been decided in favour of the regime of President 
Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, the process and the debate about the normalisation of 
relations between Arab states and Syria, as well as the country’s possible readmis-
sion into the Arab League (AL), have already begun. A return to normality would help 
strengthen the legitimacy of the Syrian regime. This, however, would run counter to 
efforts by Germany, the European Union (EU) and the USA, who seek to force the Syrian 
regime by means of sanctions and isolation to negotiate a political solution to the 
conflict. In addition to Syria’s contentious return to the AL, the articles examined 
here discuss the motives of those Arab countries wishing to normalise relations with 
Damascus, and the influence that external actors and the Covid pandemic exert on 
this process. 
 
Beyond the military victory brought about 
by Russia and Iran, the Assad regime cru-
cially needs legitimisation, especially from 
the Arab world, to consolidate its authority 
and reconstruct the country. The debate 
about the rapprochement between Arab 
states and Damascus is marked by contro-
versy. The majority of these states supported 
Assad’s enemies at the start of the conflict. 
His uncompromising war also seriously 
destabilised neighbouring countries, above 
all Jordan and Lebanon. Yet at no point 
during the civil war was Syria wholly iso-
lated – not even after its exclusion from 
the AL in November 2011. Maghreb coun-
tries, Iraq and Oman, for example, were 
mostly neutral towards the Syrian govern-
ment. Moreover, Russia’s intervention 
already foreshadowed in 2015 that the 
Assad regime would remain in place. Since 
then, various events have accelerated the 
discussion about the normalisation of 
relations between Arab countries and the 
Assad regime: first, the reopening of the 
UAE’s and Bahrain’s embassies in Damas-
cus in December 2018; second the (failed) 
attempt to have Syria readmitted to the AL 
in March 2019, driven by Tunisia, Algeria 
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and presumably Egypt; and third, the 
reinstatement of Oman’s ambassador to 
Damascus on 4 October 2020. 
This journal review examines this debate 
with a particular focus on Jordan and Leba-
non, which are not involved in the Syrian 
civil war but have nonetheless been strongly 
impacted by it. The review will also exam-
ine those countries that have assumed the 
role of opinion leaders through their active 
commitment and positioning in favour of 
normalising relations: the UAE and Egypt. 
It will draw on analyses by Arab, American, 
European and Russian researchers, pub-
lished in 2019 and 2020 in Arab and inter-
national think tanks, journals and Arab 
news media. 
The Trend towards Normalisation  
The dominant debate on the readmission 
of Syria to the AL often evokes the lack of 
regional consensus for such institutional 
reintegration of Damascus. While some 
articles call on Arab countries not to accom-
modate Syria, equally there is criticism 
of the organisation’s current state and the 
increasingly authoritarian governments 
of its member states. Other commentators 
even suspect that Damascus could exploit 
the dire situation to its advantage. 
In an article for Atlantic Council, the 
Middle East analysts Ali Hussein Bakeer 
and Giorgio Cafiero argue that despite 
a trend among Arab countries towards 
normalising their relations with Syria the 
question of Assad’s legitimacy strongly 
polarises the region. The UAE, Bahrain, Iraq 
and North African countries have called for 
and encouraged the resumption of bilateral 
relations with Damascus as well as Syria’s 
return to the AL. Relations with its neigh-
bour Jordan have been steadily improving 
as well. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have pointed 
out the necessity of a UN-led political solu-
tion to the civil war, and only Qatar has 
categorically rejected normalising relations 
with Syria. 
Imad K. Harb is the director of the Arab 
Center Washington DC, a research institution 
that is affiliated with the Arab Center for 
Research and Policy Studies in Doha. He writes 
that, ironically, it is the differences of 
opinion between Arab countries that have 
prevented them from taking the “foolish 
and costly decision” to rashly readmit Syria 
to the AL. In his view, the Arab world has 
to “hold on to at least a veneer of respect-
ability” and make any resumption of rela-
tions with Assad’s government conditional 
on the regime atoning for its crimes and 
initiating a political process. However, he 
adds, most Arab governments are authori-
tarian themselves and meanwhile gladly 
refrain from calling for a democratic tran-
sition in Syria. 
According to the Harmoon Center for 
Contemporary Studies – a research, cultural 
and media institute headquartered in Doha 
and Istanbul, and affiliated with Doha’s 
Arab Center – it is unlikely that Arab coun-
tries will give the Syrian regime, its methods 
and hostile posture towards them free rein. 
The main Arab actors involved in Syria, it 
claims, have no interest in Syria’s “victori-
ous return” to the AL because they have 
their own priorities, interests and condi-
tions, which Assad would have to meet 
before his government could enjoy reinte-
gration into the region. Yet, the authors 
argue that Arab governments’ normalisa-
tion of relations with Assad serve them as 
the latest evidence of the futility of their 
own peoples’ uprisings. Ever since the fail-
ure of the AL’s initiative to mediate the 
Syrian civil war in 2011, the organisation 
is paralysed and its policies mostly reflect 
their member states’ divergences. Yet, the 
organisation has become a means to protect 
Arab rulers and legitimate the suppression 
of their people. 
Tatyana Shmeleva, a Middle East re-
searcher with the Russian International Affairs 
Council (RIAC), a think tank close to the Rus-
sian government, believes that AL members 
that voted to expel Syria from the organi-
sation have no business lecturing Syria on 
democracy and human rights. Syria, she 
writes, does not depend on the AL and could 
afford to wait for more favourable con-
ditions in the region for its re-accession. 
 SWP Journal Review 1 
 November 2020 
 3 
Daniel L. Byman of the Center for Middle 
East Policy at the Brookings Institution, seen 
as close to the US Democrats, also views 
Damascus as being in a position of strength 
towards the Arab world and the West. For 
Byman, the fear of continued instability, 
especially at Syria’s borders, has caused 
neighbouring countries to resume contact 
with the Assad regime, albeit quietly. The 
Syrian regime, he suggests, could demand 
financial support and structured coopera-
tion from its neighbours and the EU for 
re-admitting Syrian refugees. Further, he 
believes that a limited terrorism problem, 
deliberately controlled by Damascus, could 
help the Syrian government obtain Euro-
pean and US support and present itself as 
part of a counterterrorist coalition. To that 
end, Byman writes, Assad may release 
jihadists of the so-called Islamic State from 
prison, as he did at the outbreak of the civil 
war, to exert pressure on potential coopera-
tion partners. 
Diverging Motives 
The debate about what motivates countries 
to strive to normalise relations with Syria 
shows a complex mix of issues. For Jordan 
and Lebanon, commentators write that 
their economic interests and domestic 
politics are decisive, as well as the fact that 
the Syrian civil war has had a big impact 
on them. The UAE’s and Egypt’s motives, 
however, are according to observers best 
accounted for by the countries’ financial 
and security interests, and geopolitical 
rivalry with Iran and Turkey. 
In an article for the report “Rebuilding 
Syria” published by the Istituto per gli Studi 
di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) in Milan, 
the Lebanese Middle East analyst Bachar 
El-Halabi describes how Lebanon’s and Jor-
dan’s pressing economic needs are urging 
these countries to be open towards Damas-
cus. In the medium term, he believes, both 
countries will have to tap the economic 
potential offered by the reconstruction of 
Syria and use their strategically and logis-
tically favourable location, even if the 
political price risks being too high. In 
Lebanon, he points out, rapprochement 
with Syria also has a domestic driver: the 
steady strengthening of Hezbollah, Assad’s 
ally, has shifted the discourse in Beirut 
towards resuming relations with its neigh-
bour. According to El-Halabi, Lebanese 
politicians’ instrumentalisation of the one 
million Syrian refugees in the country – 
the largest refugee-per-inhabitant ratio any-
where in the world – has turned public 
opinion in favour of entering into talks 
with Damascus for the sake of the return of 
refugees. The repatriation of refugees is also 
a priority for Jordan in its relations with 
Syria. As Jordan’s ailing economy further 
suffered from several years of border clo-
sures with Iraq and Syria, the reopening of 
border crossings, he writes, is another key 
reason for its exchanges with Damascus. 
Mohammed Bani Salameh and Ayman 
Hayajneh of Yarmouk University in Irbid, 
Jordan, devote an article in the Middle East 
Quarterly, a journal published by the Middle 
East Forum headquartered in Philadelphia, 
USA, to the situation in Jordan. They em-
phasise that the country is becoming ever 
more dependent on foreign aid by the US, 
the EU and the Gulf states due to its socio-
economic and political problems, which are 
exacerbated by the refugee crisis. This, they 
point out, significantly limits Amman’s 
room for manoeuvre in foreign policy: 
Jordan has to meet its donors’ demands 
to position itself against Assad while also 
having to contend with its own concerns 
about the Syrian uprising and the Syrian 
opposition. They conclude that Amman’s 
tightrope act of reconciling complex and 
often contradictory domestic, regional and 
international interests in relation to Syria 
in a coherent approach is becoming in-
creasingly difficult.   
The French-Lebanese journalist Mona 
Alami writes in her article for the Atlantic 
Council that Hezbollah and its allies misuse 
Lebanon as a platform for supporting Assad. 
This misuse, she claims, significantly con-
tributes to the country’s collapse and irre-
versibly ties Lebanon’s fate to that of Syria. 
For her, Hezbollah’s military involvement 
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in the Syrian civil war – which runs coun-
ter to the Lebanese government’s decision 
from 2012 to disssociate itself from Assad 
and the conflict – has turned Lebanon into 
a pariah state and distanced it from its Arab 
and Western partners. She points out that 
despite Lebanon’s heavy national debt and 
dwindling currency reserves, Hezbollah 
along with other pro-Syrian parties con-
tinues to ensure that Syria is supplied with 
subsidised food and oil. Due to its coopera-
tion with Damascus, she states, Beirut not 
only exacerbates tensions with the US and 
the Gulf states whose support it relies on 
to overcome the economic and financial 
crisis; it also risks US sanctions as part of 
the Caesar Act. 
Chafic Choucair, a researcher of Leba-
nese origin at the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies 
in Doha, comes to the conclusion that 
saving Lebanon from collapse will require 
not just the implementation of economic 
reforms and a new social contract, but 
above all Beirut’s disengagement from Syria 
and Iran. In his analysis, the explosion in 
the port of Beirut and the possibility that 
Hezbollah was indirectly or directly in-
volved deepens the social divide between 
those who support Hezbollah’s dominant 
role and Beirut’s association with Damas-
cus, and those who call for disarming the 
militia and establishing closer relations 
with Saudi Arabia and the West. The for-
mation of a Lebanese unity government 
is crucial, he believes, for overcoming the 
country’s divisions and multiple crises. This 
would require a regional and international 
consensus, including with Iran, on neutral-
ising Lebanon; which would also mean 
Hezbollah having to withdraw from Syria 
and retreat into Lebanon’s interior. If this 
fails, he fears that Lebanon might get caught 
up in further regional conflicts alongside 
Syria. 
To decrease Iran’s influence in the 
region, the UAE and Bahrain are gradually 
seeking closer ties with Assad’s govern-
ment, according to Giorgio Cafiero, the 
founder of Gulf State Analytics, in Inside 
Arabia, an Arab-American online news 
magazine based in Washington D.C. By 
seeking a rapprochement with Damascus, 
he writes, the two Gulf states plan to con-
solidate Syria’s place in the Sunni Arab 
world. However, Cafiero sees no indications 
that Assad would want to break with Tehran. 
Nevertheless, he points out, the two Gulf 
monarchies could render Damascus two 
important services that neither Iran nor 
Russia can provide: the Gulf states could 
contribute financially to the reconstruction 
of Syria and promote Syria’s rapproche-
ment with the US and EU. For him, the 
legacy of the 2003 Iraq War, which exposed 
the Arab world to Iran’s influence, strongly 
motivates Abu Dhabi and Bahrain to reach 
out to Damascus. 
Joseph Daher, a Swiss-Syrian Associate 
Professor at the European University Institute 
(EUI) in Florence, takes issue with this in 
his study for the project Wartime and Post-
Conflict in Syria. He argues that it is mislead-
ing to assume that the normalisation of 
relations between the UAE and Assad is 
based on Abu Dhabi’s efforts to counter 
Iran’s and Turkey’s influence in Syria. For 
him, the UAE’s rapprochement with Damas-
cus is instead based on regional political 
developments, the resulting shift in Abu 
Dhabi’s foreign policy priorities, and eco-
nomic interests. In 2011 and 2012, the 
UAE followed its partners from the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) in condemning 
Assad and supporting the opposition. How-
ever, Daher points out, diplomatic and 
economic channels to Damascus remained 
informally open, and the UAE sheltered 
members of the Syrian regime. He ascribes 
the UAE’s absence from the Syrian conflict 
between 2015 and 2018 to Abu Dhabi’s 
competing foreign policy priorities in Libya 
and Yemen, and the boycott of Qatar since 
2017. In his view, mutual interests in reviv-
ing economic relations were an important 
factor in the rapprochement between Syria 
and the UAE, with the latter having invest-
ment opportunities in real estate, luxury 
products, transport and trade – sectors 
which traditionally benefited significantly 
from Emirati foreign direct investment 
before 2011, as the second-largest Arab in-
vestor. According to Daher, the Syrian civil 
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war has generated a new economic elite 
that is loyal to the regime, while the Syrian 
commercial diaspora in the UAE which pre-
viously acted as middlemen lost its network 
in Damascus. Possible foreign investment 
in Syria thus needs to go through business 
networks connected with Assad. 
Economic interests, especially those con-
cerning the reconstruction of Syria, are 
also a motive for Egypt to seek contact with 
Damascus, writes the Egyptian journalist 
Albaraa Abdullah on the Arab-American 
news website Al-Monitor. However, he sees 
Cairo’s primary focus as being stability: 
Egyptian President al-Sisi, himself a military 
man, supports the Syrian army because 
he considers the integrity of Syria as fun-
damental for the security and stability of 
Egypt. [The main focus here is the regional 
fight against Islamist groups; editor’s note]. 
As Egypt is not involved in the war in Syria, 
maintains contacts with both the regime 
and parts of the opposition, and has brought 
about a ceasefire between Syrian opposition 
factions in the past, Cairo is for Abdullah 
best suited to mediate between Syria, the 
region’s countries and the international 
community. 
Great Powers and Arab Interests  
International commentators agree that 
Russia has become the dominant foreign 
power in the Arab world, but that the 
threat of US and EU sanctions outweighs 
this status, and prevents the Arab world’s 
relations with the Syrian regime from being 
normalised. Non-Western observers criticise 
that the political and economic isolation 
of Syria imposed by the US and EU aims to 
whitewash their reluctance to intervene in 
the Syrian civil war as well as the failure of 
their democratisation policies in the region. 
Ziyad Majid, a Lebanese Professor in 
Middle East Studies at the American Uni-
versity in Paris, writes in an article for the 
Al Jazeera Centre for Studies in Doha that 
the decision of Arab countries to follow up 
their original rejection of the Syrian regime 
with the normalisation of relations with 
Damascus marks a new phase in the Syrian 
conflict. In Majid’s view, Washington’s 
reticent policy towards the Syrian regime, 
even when the latter deployed chemical 
weapons, convinced the Arab world that 
the US had no desire to topple Assad de-
spite its initial mobilisation against him. 
Russia subsequently rescued the Syrian 
regime by intervening from 2015 onwards 
and created new facts on the ground, inter 
alia as part of the Astana process. According 
to Majid, Western and Arab governments 
tolerated this new status quo, which paved 
the way for the resumption of contact with 
Damascus by some Arab states, spurred on 
by the Kremlin. Had it not been for the 
sanctions imposed by the US and the EU 
other Arab countries would have been likely 
to join the UAE’s energetic push towards 
normalisation. The main reasons for most 
Arab countries avoiding further risks in 
seeking rapprochement with Assad, accord-
ing to Majid, are the severity of the sanc-
tions, Washington’s unpredictable course 
vis-à-vis Iran, and the unforeseeable conse-
quences of a definitive US withdrawal from 
Syria. 
The afore-mentioned article by Tatyana 
Shmeleva of the Russian International Affairs 
Council also represents the Russian perspec-
tive, which views the West’s isolation 
of Syria as powerful, but fundamentally 
flawed. The author explains that the West 
is preventing Syria’s reintegration into the 
region, as the legitimisation of the Syrian 
government by Arab countries would lay 
bare the failure of the West’s Syria policy 
while demonstrating the effectiveness of 
Russia’s. 
Less biased but similarly critical is the 
article by Eyal Zisser, vice rector of Tel Aviv 
University, in Middle East Quarterly: he con-
siders that the Syria policy adopted by the 
West (here, the US) and the resulting isola-
tion of the Assad regime are still guided by 
the “delusion of regional democratisation”. 
For him, Assad’s brutality against his own 
people as well as his alliance with Moscow 
and Tehran have made the attainment of 
these ideals more remote, and herald the 
end of Pax Americana in the region. In 
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Zisser’s analysis, Russia emerges as the true 
victor of the conflict, and allows Moscow to 
regain its long-lost status as the mightiest 
foreign power in the Middle East. 
In an article for the English-language 
daily The National, published in Abu Dhabi, 
the journalist and essayist Faisal Al Yafai 
speaks out against the USA and Russia in-
fluencing the relations between Arab states 
and Syria. Russia’s aim in pressing Arab 
states to re-establish relations with Assad, 
he writes, is to attract funds for Syria’s 
costly reconstruction, which Moscow will 
be involved in for the medium to long 
term. While the US is right to ostracise the 
regime, Al Yafai points out, the sanctions 
also punish the civilian population and en-
courage Damascus to destabilise the region 
further. In his view, the US and Arab coun-
tries take up diametrically opposed posi-
tions: the US is convinced that isolating 
Assad will sooner or later force him to re-
linquish his alliance with Iran; from the 
Arab perspective, however, it is precisely 
this exclusion of Syria that is driving the 
country into the arms of Russia and Iran. 
Al Yafai therefore concludes that neither 
the US nor Russia can contribute to improv-
ing conditions for Syrians within or outside 
of Syria, and that it is high time for Arab 
countries to decide what relationship with 
Syria is in their own interest. 
The Covid-19 Pandemic 
Various articles on the effects of the corona-
virus pandemic in the Middle East show 
that the crisis seems to favour the normali-
sation of diplomatic relations between Arab 
countries and Damascus. 
An example is an article by Sandy 
Alkoutami and Khulood Fahim, a Syrian-
American and an Egyptian James C. Gaither 
Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace in Washington D.C. They 
write that countries such as Jordan, the 
UAE, Egypt and Bahrain have used the ex-
ceptional circumstances of the pandemic 
to justify their softening stance vis-à-vis the 
Syrian regime. This, the authors say, con-
tributes to a wider acceptance of Assad’s 
rule both regionally and internationally. In 
their view, particularly the posturing of the 
UAE’s Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Zayid 
could be instrumental for Syria’s regional 
rehabilitation: he has emphasised that the 
humanitarian challenges presented by the 
pandemic outweigh any political issues 
between the two countries. The crisis is also 
convenient for Moscow, the authors argue, 
in its efforts to rehabilitate Assad’s govern-
ment in the region and internationally: 
Putin insists that Damascus serves as the 
sole administrator of crisis measures and 
aid delivered to Syria. The United Nations 
meanwhile have called for sanctions against 
Syria to be relaxed during the pandemic. 
 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, a Jordanian 
journalist and Middle East analyst, argues 
in an article for The National that the Syrian 
regime is aiming to capitalise politically on 
the crisis to blame the US and EU sanctions 
for the hardship in the country. As the 
Syrian regime seeks to rejoin the AL, Oweis 
writes, it affirms its independence from Iran 
issuing propaganda claiming that the virus 
was brought into the country by Shiite pil-
grims from neighbouring countries rather 
than – as is generally assumed – by mili-
tias stationed in Syria and commanded by 
Tehran. 
Conclusion 
The debate shows a trend towards the bi-
lateral normalisation of relations between 
some Arab countries and the Assad govern-
ment. The articles reviewed here show how 
the lack of a regional consensus on Syria’s 
readmittance to the AL and its political and 
economic isolation by the US and the EU 
are hampering the progress of Arab states 
normalising their relations with Syria. The 
authors largely welcome this fact, but they 
also point out that the implementation of 
EU and US policy towards Syria has an im-
pact on the neighbouring countries – since 
it runs counter to their economic, domestic 
and security concerns. It also disregards the 
hardship in countries such as Jordan and 
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Lebanon that partly justifies their coopera-
tion with Damascus. 
The articles also make clear that the lack 
of unity among Arab countries and the 
paralysis of the AL inhibit the formulation 
and achievement of common Arab interests 
regarding Syria. The opinion leaders UAE 
and Egypt are pursuing their own commer-
cial, security and geopolitical interests in 
their rapprochement with Damascus. 
For their Syria policy, Germany and 
the EU should take into account both the 
debate and the dynamics of the normalisa-
tion process between the Arab world and 
Damascus, including the motives driving 
those involved. Together with the US, the 
German and European policy towards Syria 
continues to bank on forcing Damascus to 
change behaviour through political and 
economic isolation. However, governments 
should consider, as the authors illustrate, 
the political and economic intertwining 
of Syria and its neighbouring countries, as 
well as the destabilising potential of the 
refugee crisis for the region. The articles’ 
critical perspectives on the incoherence of 
Europe’s and America’s approach vis-à-vis 
Syria and on the premises underpinning 
their Middle East policies should be food 
for thought for Berlin and Brussels. 
Attention should be drawn to the appeals 
by several Arab authors for two things: more 
participation by Arab countries in peace 
negotiations for Syria, and more self-deter-
mination for Arab countries in shaping 
their relations with Damascus. The UAE 
and Egypt emerge from the debate as the 
key Arab actors able to influence the course 
of normalisation between Arab states and 
Syria. Germany and the EU need to be aware 
that Abu Dhabi and Cairo, backed by Mos-
cow, are willing to undermine the West’s 
policy of isolating the Syrian regime – and 
yet seek dialogue with them regardless, so 
as to be constructively involved in shaping 
the process of normalisation. 
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